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DOE AND SMITH v. MUTUAL OF OMAHA
INSURANCE COMPANY: THE POSSIBLE IMPACT
OF INSURANCE CAPS ON HIV-INFECTED
INDIVIDUALS
May Carol Joly*
INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) was enacted to
address the ovenvhelming problem of rampant discrimination, both
intentional and unintentional against all people with disabilities.' The
purpose of the legislation was to provide a "clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities to provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals
with disabilities."
2
The question of how the ADA applies to the form and content of
insurance policies is one that is mired in much confusion revolving
around questions of legal interpretation and construction. It is often in
the course of technical legal analysis that the simple purpose of laws is
obscured. Although the ADA is not perfect with respect to clarity in all
aspects, the prevailing theme supporting equal treatment for all
'Notes & Comments Editor, DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HFALTH CArtE LAW; Juris Doctor
candidate 2001, DePaul University College of Lav, Chicago, Illinois; Bachelor of Art- dagree,
Canisius College, Buffalo, New York. The author wishes to thank the clients. ad% ocateQ, and
attorneys at Equip for Equality Inc., Chicago, Illinois, for their steadfast strufale a~ainq1
disability discrimination which inspired this article.
'42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994). This purpose was based in part on Congre iional finding-
which stated:
[S]ome 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a v.hole is;
growing older historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities, and despite some improvements. such form
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to bha a
serious and pervasive social problem.
d § 12101(a)(1).
2See id
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW[
regardless of their disabilities rings through.3 The Supreme Court has
yet to clarify whether, and just how, the ADA applies to private
insurance policies. Certain circuit courts have, however, written on this
issue.4 In particular, on June 2, 1999 the Illinois Appellate court ruled
that caps on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in
privately funded insurance policies, which were not based on any
actuarial data, did not violate the ADA.5 The effect this ruling will
have upon persons infected with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
will be to bar them from equal participation in the benefits of privately
funded insurance plans. This ruling goes against the purpose and intent
of the ADA in two ways. First, it legitimizes a denial of access to
private companies based only on disability status thus allowing stigma-
based decision making.6 Second, on a public policy note, it effectively
assures that the financial burden of treatment for AIDS and AIDS-
related conditions will land first upon the limited resources of the
infected individual and then upon the state when those resources are
exhausted.7
This article will first address the medical implications of infection
with HIV. It will then briefly trace the background of the ADA, the
legal definition of disability, and specifically whether HIV-infected
status constitutes a disability under the ADA. Third, this article will
look to the way in which medical insurance providers are regulated
under Title III of the ADA, dealing with equal access to places of
3See Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 697
(1999) (discussing the ambiguity of the term "impairment" within the statutory language of the
ADA).
4See Doe & Smith v. Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
5See id.6Such stigma-based decision making has been held to be unconstitutional in AIDS
testing contexts. See Michael T. Flannery, Mandatory HIV Testing Of Professional Boxers: An
Unconstitutional Effort To Regulate A Sport That Needs To Be Regulated, 31 U.C. DAvIS L.
REv. 409, 466-67 (1998).
7This result seems directly opposed to specific language of the ADA which states:
[T]he Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to
assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency for such individuals; and continuing existence of
unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with
disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue
those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous, and
costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting
from dependency and nonproductivity.
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(8) (1994).
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public accommodations. Next, the article will take an in-depth look
into a recent Seventh Circuit decision that held Title III inapplicable to
an insurance company, which placed caps on AIDS and AIDS-related
injuries. Finally, it will question the wisdom of the Seventh Circuit
holding in light of other legislation and public policy considerations.
BACKGROUND
lIV, AIDS, and AIDS-Related Conditions
AIDS, which was first reported in 1981, has become one of the most
serious epidemics in recent history.8 A virus known as the human
immunodeficiency virus or HIV causes AIDS. 9 This virus hampers the
body's ability to combat infections by attacking the immune system.'
0
ILV can be transmitted through sexual contact, contaminated blood,
infectious needles, pregnancy, and mother's breast milk."
It is now widely recognized in the medical field that HIV causes
12 atcsteimnAIDS. HIV attacks the body's immune system by destroying
important immune cells called CD4-T cells or T-helper cells.'" The T-
helper cell count of a healthy person is generally 800-1,200 per cubic
millimeter of blood.' 4 A dangerously low T-helper cell count is one
that is below 200 per cubic millimeter and results in a greater risk of
contracting opportunistic infections'sand cancer.1
Approximately three-tenths of one percent of the national
population--650,000 to 900,000 persons--in the United States are
SNAJD Fact Sheet, HIV Infection andAIDS, at
http:,vv.niaid.nih.gov/factsheetshivinf.htm (last visited: September 9, 2000) [hereinafter
HIV Infection and AIDS].
9See Cause ofAIDS, at http:llvv,%.cdc.govihivthivinfoloverview (last visited September
9, 2000) [hereinafter Cause ofAIDS-HIJ].
'
0See idl
"See HIV Infection and AIDS, supra note 3; see also HI Trarnmwmsan, at
http'/www.cdc.govhiv/hivinfo/vfax/260010.htm (last visited July 9, 2U00), fce also Nancy R.
Mansfield et al., Insurance Caps on AIDS-Related Healthcare Costs l'l th2 ADA fill the Gap
Created by ERISA?, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 601, 604 (1998).
12Cause ofAids-HiV, supra note 9.
3See NL4ID Fact Sheet, How HIV Causes AIDS, at
http'//vlnvv.niaid.nih.govlfactsheetsLhowhiv.htm (last visited September 9,2000).
4See id
"
5See id
'
6See id
2000]
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currently infected with HIV. 17  Although the greatest percentage of
infected persons includes adult men, there is a growing trend in
reported cases among adult women and children, especially those in
minority groups.' 8 There is, however, an increasing difficulty in
gathering data that accurately reflects the current trend of the virus.
19
This is due primarily to the fact that recent advances in treatment have
slowed the time period between infection, onset of AIDS, and death
resulting from AIDS.2 ° While, on one hand, this is encouraging
because death caused by HIV is decreasing, it causes problems in
assessing data that is extremely important in determining the location
and rate of incidence of new infections.2 1 This information is necessary
for providing prevention and treatment services.22
HIV has various stages of symptomatic occurrences.23 In the
earliest stage, an infected person will experience flu-like symptoms
within one to two months of exposure to the virus.2 4 These symptoms
continue for a relatively short time, usually a week to a month and
constitute the time at which the infected person is most contagious.
25
In the second stage HIV goes into an asymptomatic period that may last
anywhere from a few months to ten years. It is at this point that the
immune system is deteriorating and the body's T-helper cells are being
increasingly destroyed. 7 HIV-infected persons experience various
symptoms including: "swollen glands, . . . lack of energy, weight loss,
frequent fevers and sweats, persistent or frequent yeast infections (oral
7See CDC-NCHSTP-Divisions of HIV/AIDS Prevent.. .RMATION - STATISTICAL
PROJECTIONS/TRENI, at http://vww.cdc.gov/hiv/hivinfo/vfax/260210.htm (last visited July
9, 2000) [hereinafter Statistical Projections].
18See id. at 2. The Centers for Disease Control states that approximately one in every
300 persons is infected with the virus. See id. at 2. This statistic is clarified further along
gender lines to show that the disease affects approximately one in every 160 males is affected
and one in every 1.000 females. See id. at 2. In 1998, 688,200 cases of AIDS were reported,
See id. at 2. The breakdown went as follows: "679,739 adolescents and adults, 570,425 men,
109,311 women, and 8,461 children less than 13 years of age. See id. at 2. A total of 410,800
of the 688,200 persons reported with AIDS have died." Id. at 1.
'
9See id.20See id.21See id.22See Statistical Projections, supra note 17, at 1.
2'See id.24See id.2SSee id.26See id.27See Statistical Projections, supra note 17, at 1.
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or vaginal), persistent skin rashes or flak skin, pelvic inflammatory
disease that does not respond to treatment, or short-term memory
loss.,
2 8
In the third stage of HTV, an individual is diagnosed with AIDS.
29
Officially this stage begins when an infected person's T-cell count falls
below 200.30 It is the period at which the immune system becomes
unable to combat opportunistic infections, or infections which would
normally be easily overcome by healthy immune systems exhibiting
such symptoms as: coughing, shortness of breath, seizures, mental
symptoms such as confusion and forgetfilness, severe and persistent
diarrhea, fever, vision loss, severe headaches, weight loss, extreme
fatigue, nausea, vomiting, lack of coordination, coma, abdominal
cramps, or difficult or painful swallowing.31 In the final stage of AIDS
persons with the virus contract various serious and often fatal diseases
such as Kaposi's sarcoma and lymphoma, which are more difficult to
treat in persons with the disease due to the decreased effectiveness of
the immune system.
32
While AIDS is presently considered a fatal disease, there are still
avenues for treatment. HIV is treated primarily through pharmaceutical
avenues.33 There are three main types of drugs that are implemented in
28See id
79HIV Infection andAIDS, supra note 8.
3 See id.
31See id.
3
'
2See id33See HIV Infection and AIDS, supra note 8, at 2; see also HI1' Infcctton ar. AIDS at
http'vww.niaid.nih.go/fatsheets/hivinf.htm (last visited September 9. 200 0) stating:
The Food and Drug Administration has approved a number of drugs for the
treatment of HIV infection. The first group of drugs used to treat HIV
infection, called nucleoside analog reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NRTIsh,
interrupt an early stage of virus replication. Included in this class of drugs
are zidovudine (also known as AZT), zalcitabine (ddC), didanosine (ddl)h
stavudine (D4T), lamivudine (3TC) and abacavir succinate. Theze drugs
may slow the spread of HIV in the body and delay the onset of
opportunistic infections. Importantly, they do not prevent transmission of
HIV to other individuals. Non-nucleoside reverse transcriptae inhibitors
(NNRTIs) such as delavirdine, nevirapine and efavirenz are dlyo a~ailable
for use in combination with other antiretroviral drugs. A third elas of antt-
HIV drugs, called protease inhibitors, interrupts virus replication at a later
step in its life cycle. They include ritonavir, saquini~ir. indinair and
nelfinavir. Because HIV can become resistant to each class of drugs,
combination treatment using both is necessary to effecthely suppress the
virus.
2000]
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treatment.34 These groups are comprised of: nucleoside analog reverse
transcriptase inhibitors (NRTIs) which have been found to be effective
in the early stage of the virus; non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase
inhibitors (NNRTIs), which are used to supplement other
antiretrovirals; and protease inhibitors, which attack the virus in it's
later stages.
35
The Battle for Civil Rights for People with Disabilities
The birth of civil rights came with the Reconstructionist Congress'
enactment of three Constitutional Amendments prohibiting slavery and
involuntary servitude throughout the United States and then the
Supreme Court's interpretation thereof.36 In 1871, as the Ku Klux Klan
(Klan) terrorized the South, Congress responded by enacting the Ku
Klux Klan Act to curb the Klan's activities in the South.37 The Act
created a federal civil cause of action against individuals who conspire
to deprive any person, or class of persons, "equal protection of the
laws" or "equal privileges and immunities under the laws. 38
Currently available antiretroviral drugs do not cure people of HIV infection
or AIDS, however, and they all have side effects that can be severe. AZT
may cause a depletion of red or white blood cells, especially when taken in
the later stages of the disease. If the loss of blood cells is severe, treatment
with AZT must be stopped. DdI can cause an inflammation of the pancreas
and painful nerve damage.
Id 34See HIV Infection and AIDS, supra note 8.
"See id.
36See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that "separate but
equal" schools were inherently unequal and deprived black students of equal protection of the
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (construing
the due process clause to allow for mandating racial segregation in railroad passenger
compartments); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (comprising a compilation of cases
involving alleged private racial discrimination by six different persons from throughout the
United States).
37See Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §1985(3) (1994)).381d. The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 reads, in pertinent part:
If two or more persons.., conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on
the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.., in any case
of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged
therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such
conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
[Vol. 4:193
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The legal significance of defining the disabled as possessing
"class" status was illustrated by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit in Lake v. Arnold, where a woman with a mental
disability was sexually sterilized without her consent.39 After analyzing
Elizabeth Arnold Lake's claim of deprivation of civil rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) the court concluded that people with mental
disabilites are a class for purposes of 
§1985 analysis.4  
While the Reconstructionist amendments were construed very
narrowly after their enactment and were applied only to race
discrimination, they are now looked to as an all-embodying American
statement on the sanctity of the right of the individual human person to
all of the basic rights inherent in a free society. 41 The notion of civil
rights is one which has been taken up as a weapon against
discrimination based on not only race but also national origin,42
gender,43religion,a4sexual identity,45and, more recently, disability
United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the
recovery of damages... against any one or more of the conspirators.
It
39Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 6S2, 687 (3d Cir. 1997).40See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), quoted in Lake v. Arnold, 112 r.3d 682, 687 (3d Cir. 1997)
The statute provides, in pertinent part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire,..for the purpose
of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of pjuc ,ns of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunittes
under the laws.. .the party so injured or deprived may have an action for tite
recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any
one or more of the conspirators. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).41See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BmTH OF FaEEDOm: HUMA, RtasTS, NAmED
AND UNNAmED 146-48 (1997); DAvID A.J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND TiE CONSTrUTION:
HIsToRY, THEORY, AND LAW, OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 199-232 (1993)42See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause is not unavailable to individuals based on national origin).43See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding exclusion ofvomen
at military academy violative of the Equal Protection Clause); Califano v. Goldfarb. 430 U'S,
199 (1977) (holding gender-based distinction between widowvs and widovers and gender-based
discrimination against covered female wage earners with respect to Social Sccurtiv benefit,
violative of due process and equal protection clause); Craig v. Boran. 429 U S 190 1 1976)
(holding statistics regarding drinking habits of young adults to he an Insufficient bas1; for
gender-based classifications); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding state disability
insurance program provision excluding benefits for disability resulting from normal pregnancy
did not violate Equal Protection Clause); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 US. 677 (1973j
(holding classifications based upon sex are inherently suspect and must be subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding statute v.hich provided that as
between persons equally qualified to administer estates males must be preferred to females
2000]
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status.46  One such legislative weapon that has been born out of thisphilosophy is the ADA, which has been labeled "a civil rights bill. ' 47
The Americans with Disabilities Act
In 1991, Congress passed the ADA in order to definitively end
discrimination against people with disabilities and reestablish their civil
rights.48 Prior to the enactment of this legislation, protection against
discrimination based on disabilities was available only in limited
aspects. 49  For instance, in 1973, Congress passed the Rehabilitation
Act, which prohibited discrimination against persons with disabilities
but applied only to claims against the federal government."0 While the
Rehabilitation Act recognized the federal government's duty to foster
the rights of all citizens including those with disabilities, it left
unspoken, and thus unenforceable, the duty with respect to the rest of
society to adhere to it's construct. 51 In 1990, the ADA provided the
much-needed supplemental protection. 52 The ADA filled some of the
previous legislation's gaping holes and was touted as "the most
comprehensive civil rights measure in the past two and a half
decades." 53 The ADA expands the duty to uphold the rights of persons
with disabilities to apply to non-governmental entities. 54  The Act is
split into five separate titles, which prohibit discrimination on several
levels: Title I prohibits discrimination based on disability within the
violative of the Equal Protection Clause).
44See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding a significant state interest
can prevail over a free exercise of religion interest); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(holding only a significant state interest can effectively override the free exercise of religion
interest).45See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that legislation which
serves only to make homosexual status unequal is unconstituional).
46See, e.g., City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Center, 793 U.S. 432 (1985),47H.R. REP. No. 101-485(I), at 25 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 268.
4See 42 U.S.C. §12100 (1994).
49See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
50See id.5
'See Pub. L. No. 93-112 § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1994)).
52See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12110 (1994).53Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disablities Act: Analysis and Implications
ofa Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413, 414 (1991),
54See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182-12189 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages or accommodations of any place of public accommodation).
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employment context;55 Title II prohibits discrimination by entities,
receive federal assistance; 56 Title III prohibits discrimination by private
entities, that hold themselves open to the public;5 7 Title IV prohibits
discrimination in telecommunications; 53 and Title V contains
miscellaneous anti-discrimination provisions.
59
Disability Defined
In order to utilize the ADA to uphold basic civil rights, a person first
must meet the definitional requirements of disability.'" The ADA
defines disability in a three-prong format. A person will be considered
to have a disability if that person (1) has a "physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more. . .major life
activities," (2) has a "record of' such an impairment; or (3) is "regarded
as having such an impairment." 6' Additionally, a determination as to
whether a disability exists will be made on a case-by-case basis. z
The Supreme Court has recently substantially qualified the
disability definition by interpreting the ADA to apply to only those
individuals vith substantial limitations after any mitigating medical
measures are in place.63  In other words, if a condition is somehow
corrected, or controlled, by medication or some other measure, the
ADA definition of disability does not apply. 6
"'See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994).
6See 42 U.S.C. § 12131-12134, 12141-12150, 12161-12165 (1994)
TSee 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1994).
"
5See 47 U.S.C § 225 (1996).
'
9See 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (1994).69See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).61See i&L62See id
63See generally Albertsons, Inc., v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. UPS,
527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) tall holding determination
of disability is properly made after taking into account mitigating measures). In these e-w s,
the Supreme Court looked at three examples of mitigating measures including corrective
lenses, and blood pressure medication. The Court advised that the inquir, into % hether a
specific mitigating measure constituted a "corrected condition" should be made on a c 2 by
case basis, and pointed out that prong three of the definition of disability or the -regarded as'
prong would still be a valid context within , hich to bring an ADA claim. Sutton, 527 U S. at
489. An analysis of whether infection with the HIV virus constitutes a disability under this
new interpretation given by the Supreme Court is beyond the scope of this discussion, It is
relevant to note, however, that Mutual of Omaha conceded on the issue of vhether the
plaintiffs were persons with disabilities by accepting that they were.
64See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 1241.
2000]
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HIV-Positive Status as a Disability
Notwithstanding the recent Supreme Court interpretation of the
definition of disability, persons infected with AIDS will likely remain
persons with disabilities under the law.65 This is because the Supreme
Court recently held, in Bragdon v. Abbott, that asymptomatic HIV-
status constitutes a disability, substantially limiting the major life
function of procreation. 66 The Court's ruling resolved the split in the
circuits over this issue.
67
Prior to Bragdon, the Fourth Circuit held that a bank employee
with asymptomatic HIV was not a person with a disability under the
three-prong ADA definition and thus lacked standing to bring an
employment discrimination claim.68 The court based this ruling on the
fact that there were no immediate debilitating effects suffered by the
individual.69 Secondly, the court held that a concern about the risk of
possible infection to a partner did not create a substantial limitation on
the life function of procreation or sexual intercourse. 70  The court
reasoned the infection did not inherently restrict procreation or sexual
intimacy.
71
Alternatively, the First Circuit came to the opposite result in the
appellate decision of Abbott v. Bragdon.72 In this case, the plaintiff was
denied dental treatment due to HIV-positive status.73  The court, in a
two-part ruling, found HIV-status to be a physical impairment and
procreation to be a major life activity. 74  Eight-percent risk of
65See Sarah Lynn Oquist, Reproduction Constitutes a "Major Life Activity" tinder the
ADA: Implications of the Supreme Court's Decision in Bragdon v. Abbott, 32 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 1357, 1431 (April, 1999).
66See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).67See generally Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F.Supp. 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Cain
v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Ohio 1994);
T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F. Supp. 110 (D.Utah, C.D. 1993) (all favoring inclusion of HIV-
infection as disabilities). Cf Zatarian v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F.Supp. 240 (E.D, La.
1995); Cortes v. McDonald's Corp., 955 F. Supp 541 (E.D. N.C. 1996); Abbott v. Bragdon 107
F.3d 934 (Ist Cir. 1997) (all opposing inclusion of reproductive impairments and HIV-infection
as disabilities).65See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997).69See id. at 160.
7 See id. at 170.
71See id.72Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997).
73See id. at 937.
74See id. at 939-40.
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transmission was found to be not insignificant in the assessment of
whether a concern of transmission created a substantial limitation.
Additionally, the court noted that a showing of a desire to procreate
was not necessary.
76
The Supreme Court resolved this split in the circuits by granting
certiorari to Abbott v. Bragdon and affirming the First Circuit's
holding. 77 The Court found IHIV-positive status to constitute a physical
impairment because there are immediate systemic changes after
infection with the virus.7 8 Secondly, the Court reaffirmed the notion
that reproduction constitutes a central function within the life process. 9
Thus the Court held that asymptomatic HIV-infection qualified as "an
impairment which substantially limits the major life activity of
reproduction."
80
Title III of the ADA
Title III of the ADA was ratified in order to ensure that persons with
disabilities have access to private businesses, which hold themselves
out to provide goods and services to the public.3' The Act states: "No
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation
by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of
public accommodation." S2 In order to establish discrimination under
Title III of the ADA a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) that he or
she has a disability; (2) that the defendant is a "private entity" engaged
in the operation of a "public accommodation;" and (3) that the plaintiff
75See id at 942.76See id
77See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 655.7
sSee id at 657.
79See id at 660.
50See id at 655. Similarly, HIV has been ruled to be a "handicap' under Cil Rights
Laws. See e.g., Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Fraf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310 (E D.Pa, 1944) (holding
attorney with HIV to have a physical or mental impairment that substantially limited one of his
major life activities and thus was a disability); Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp, 632 D Ma .
1991) (holding patient with HIV to be handicapped under the RehabilitationActi; Benjamin R.
v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814 (W.Va. 1990) (holding perzon vho tesL pDoitive
for HIV has "handicap" within the meaning of West Virginia Human Rights ActJ.
"ISee 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
'2See id.
2000)
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was denied access on the basis of his or her disability and that the
defendant failed to make "reasonable accommodations" that would not
"fundamentally alter" the character of the place of public
accommodation. 3
Place of Public Accommodation
A "place of public accommodation" is defined by the ADA as "a
facility, operated by a private entity whose operations affect commerce
and fall within at least one" category laid out in § 12181(7). 84 These
categories include:
A. An inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging,
except for an establishment located within a
building that contains not more than five rooms
for rent or hire ad that is actually occupied by the
proprietor of such establishment as the residence
of such proprietor;
B. A restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving
food or drink;
C. A motion picture house, theatre, concert hall,
stadium, or other place of exhibition or
entertainment;
D. An auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or
other place of public gathering;
E. A bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware
store, shopping center, or other sales or rental
establishment;
F. A laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop,
beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service,
3See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)-(b); see also Kaltenberger v, Ohio College of Podiatric MCd.
162 F.3d 432, 435 (6th Cir. 1998); Andrews v. State of Ohio, 104 F.3d S03, 807 (6th Cir.
1997); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Case W. Reserve Univ., 666 N.E.2d 1376, 1383 (1996).
1442 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(1994).
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funeral parlor, gas station, office of accountant or
lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional
office of a health care provider, hospital, or other
service establishment;
G. A terminal, depot, or other station used for
specified public transportation;
H. A museum, library, gallery, or other place of
public display or collection;
I. A park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of
recreation;
J. A nursery, elementary, secondary,
undergraduate, or post graduate private school,
or other place of education;
K. A day care enter, senior citizen center, homeless
shelter, food bank, adoption agency, or other
social service center establishment; and
L. A gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf
course, or other place of exercise or recreation."
The analysis of whether there exsts discrimination under Title III
should properly focus on the "place" of accommodation rather than a
certain "event." 6 This section of the ADA will cover an entity if it
falls within the category of owning, leasing, or operating property.37
The ADA fails to provide a precise definition describing what "in
operation" entails.88 However, the preamble to the Code of Federal
Regulations, which implement the ADA, indicate that temporary
SS42 U.S.C.A. § 12181(7) (1994). See Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 23
C.F.R. § 36.104 (1999).
6Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000); Olinger v. United State- Golf
Ass'n., 55 F. Supp. 2d 926, 930 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
87See Olinger 55 F. Supp. 2d at 931., citing 28 CFR pt. 36. app B at 591(1993).
"
8See id
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utilization of property will constitute "operation" if the alleged
discrimination occurred during the time of utilization. 89 Courts have
further clarified this by holding that an entity will be determined to be
"in operation" of a place of public accommodation if it exhibits
sufficient control over a location.90 Sufficient control is established by
showing a "close connection" between the facility and the entity in
question.91 In Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America,92the court held that for
an entity to constitute a "place of public accommodation," a
membership organization must have "a close connection to a particular
facility."93 This connection exists if (1) the organization is affiliated
with a particular facility, and (2) membership in (or certification by)
that organization acts as a necessary predicate to use of the facility.
94
Access Denied on the Basis of Disability
Discrimination by private entities offering public senices occurs (1)
when an entity imposes eligibility criteria which tends to "screen out"
individuals with disabilities, (2) when persons are denied the
opportunity to participate in a public accommodation's goods and
services or, by virtue of a failure to make reasonable modifications,
unless those modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the
goods or services, or (3) when an entity fails to take steps to modify
necessary to ensure persons with disabilities are not denied services or
treated differently than those without disabilities.95 A plaintiff alleging
discrimination under Title III is not required to prove discriminatorily
motivated animus in order to state a claim. 96 Rather, a plaintiff needs
to show that he or she has a disability and that, due to this disability,
89See 28 C.F.R. 36, app. B, at 593.
90See id. at 5. See generally Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 9 F. Supp, 2d
460 (D.N.J.1998) (holding athletic association to be a "private entity" and thus potentially
subject to Title III of ADA); Tatum v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. 992 F. Supp. 1114
(E.D. Mo. 1998) (holding the NCAA operates a place of public accommodation).
91See Ganden v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1996 WL 680000. at *10 (N.D.Ill.
1996).
92993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993).
93See id. at 1270.
94See id. at 1272; Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217, 223 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
95See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (1994).
96See id.; see Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Cir., Inc., 866 F. Supp, 433 (ND.Cal.
1994).
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was denied access to a service.97 These modifications are not absolute,
however. The modifications are not required if they would
"fundamentally alter" the nature of the goods or services;9 if by
making them the entity would be subjected to an "undue burden;"(), or
if they would impose a "direct threat" to the health and safety of
others.100
Reasonable Modification
The reasonable modification analysis under Title III is parallel to the
reasonable modification analysis of the ADA's other titles.' 0' A
determination of whether a modification is reasonable involves a case-
by-case, fact specific inquiry. 10 2 This inquiry requires weighing the
efficacy of the modification against the entity's cost of
implementation. 10 3  A modification will be deemed unreasonable if,
when looking at the overall operations, it alters the essential nature of
the facility and a financial burden will result.'04 Finally, due to the
fact-specific nature of the necessary inquiry, the question of vhether a
modification is reasonable will generally be one which has to be
answered at trial and not at the summary judgment stage. 105
Insurance Companies as Places of Public Accomnimodation
As seen above, the ADA specifically included insurance offices within
the listing of examples of facilities covered by the public
accommodations provision of the ADA."'b Thus, it is undisputed that
Congress contemplated insurance providers in the drafting of Title
H1.107 A more difficult issue involves the scope of this coverage.
While the language of Title III specifically refers to "insurance
97See 42 U.S.C. § 12183(b) (1994).9SSee 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
"
9See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1994).
'
0
"See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994).
10t See Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp., 993 F. Supp. 861, 863 (D. \V.o. 19t ])
"'
2See iL
103See Staron v. McDonald's Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 355-56 (2d Cir. 19951
'O°See Powers, 993 F.Supp. at 868; Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297. 305 (3d Cir 1994)
105See Powers, 993 F. Supp. at 868; see also Crowder v. Kitagar:a. 31 F.3d 1400, 14U3
(9th Cir. 1996).
'05See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir.2000). Olinger %. United States
Golf Ass'n, 55 F. Supp. 2d 926, 930 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
'"
7See 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (7)(F).
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offices,"'' 0 8 when read in conjunction with the rest of the Act, it
becomes evident that the broad prohibition against discrimination is
aimed at every manifestation of discrimination within public
accommodations. 109 The ADA includes within the definition of
discrimination the denial of "full and equal enjoyment of the goods.
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation."" 0 It should
follow that unlawful discrimination would exist when an insurance
company drafts a policy, which refuses to cover the disabilities of
some, absent some type of sound and reasonable justification., 11
However, this type of self-evident clarity is not found among those on
either side of this issue.
Insurance companies, employers, and policy holders have all
offered differing interpretations involving the question of whether Title
III applies to the content of policies, mere access to buildings that
house insurance offices, or some intermediate conceptual construct.
112
Thus interpretation of the provision ultimately ends up in the hands of
the courts where a consensus is likewise indistinct.113
'
0
°See id.
"'
9See id.
11042 U.S.C. §12182(a).
1 "See id.
"
2See generally Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co, 999 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. 111, 1998)
(holding Title III to apply to the content of health insurance policies) (reversed by 179 F.3d 557
(7th Cir. 1999)); Lenox v. Healthwise of Kentucky, 149 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding
health insurance policy provided by private insurance company on behalf of school district to
district employees was a good or service provided by place of public accommodation within
meaning of ADA); Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1185 (N.D.Cal.
1998) (holding Title III of the ADA applies to insurance underwriting practices); Attar v.
Unum, No. CA3-96-CV-367, R, 1998 WL 574885 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 1998) (holding benefit
plans are public accommodations under Title III); Kotev. v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F.
Supp. 1316 (C.D.Cal. 1996) (holding denial of life insurance based on applicant's association
with his HIV-positive spouse was actionable under ADA). Compare; Ford v. Schering-Plough
Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding the provision of disability benefits by employer's
private insurer did not qualify as a public accommodation) (3d Cir. 1998); Lewis v. Kmart
Corp., 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding Title I of ADA did not require long-term
disability plan sponsored by private employer to provide the same level of benefits tbr mental
and physical disabilities); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997)
(holding ADA's prohibition against disability discrimination in any public accommodation did
not govern content of long-term disability policy offered by employer).
"
3See id.
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Jurisdictions Holding the ADA Not Applicable
to Discrimination in Insurance
There are three main lines of reasoning that comprise court decisions,
from jurisdictions which have held Title III of the ADA inapplicable to
discrimination in insurance policies." 4 First, these courts have held
that "place of public accommodation" must refer to the denial of access
to a physical place." 5 In Parker v. Metropolitanl 1 the court agreed
that an insurance office is a public accommodation as expressly set
forth in Title III. However, since the plaintiff in that case did not seek
the goods and services of an insurance qfice and instead accessed a
benefit plan provided by her private employer and issued by NetLife
her claim was not covered by Title II.117 The court decided that "a
benefit plan offered by an employer is not a good offered by a place of
public accommodation. . . .[and that] a public accommodation is a
physical place."" I
8
Second, and somewhat related to the first line of reasoning, courts
have noted that the ADA does not prohibit discrimination that can be
characterized as discrimination "among disabilities" as opposed to
discrimination between those with disabilities and those without)
For example in Parker, the Sixth Circuit held that a disability plan
obtained through an employer that provided less coverage for mental
impairments than physical impairments was not invalid under the ADA
because it was not a "'good or service of a place of public
accommodation."' 120  The plaintiff was seeking redress for the
termination of her mental health benefits and brought an action under
Title III of the ADA alleging that the terms of the insurance policy
were discriminatory in nature. 121 The plaintiff alleged unequal accessto the insurance benefits for persons with mental disabilities after the
"
4See, e.g., Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.. 121 F.3d 1006 (61h Cir l'9971 liuidim!
ADA's prohibition against disability discrimination in any public accommJa1tt did not
govern content of long-term disability policy offered by employer); Ford % chcrin-'lough
Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding the provision of disabiltty benefit b emplwers
private insurer did not qualify as a public accommodation).
"15See Doe & Smith v. Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999)
116121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997).
"
7 See id at 1010.
""See id
"
9See idt120Parker, 121 F.3d at 1008.
121See id. at 1008.
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plan stopped covering mental disorders but continued to cover physical
injuries.' 2 The plaintiff argued that this was discrimination based on
her disability, namely depression. 123 The court was not persuaded.
124
The Sixth Circuit held that Title III did not refer to terms of insurance
policies but rather, solely to the physical access to goods and
services.125 The court focused on the fact that the plaintiff did not
access her policy from the actual insurance office but rather through her
employer ,and, thus, there was no sufficient "nexus between the
disparity in benefits and the services which MetLife offers to the public
from its insurance office."'
126
The Sixth Circuit employed similar reasoning in Lenox v.
Healthwise of Kentucky. 127  In Lenox, the court held that even if
insurance is a good or service of a public accommodation, the refusal to
cover heart transplants cannot be grounds for a Title III claim because
Title III requires the denial of access to a physical place in order for a
certain practice to fall within the protection of the ADA. 12  The
plaintiff was denied coverage for a heart transplant where the plan
covered other organ transplants. 129 The court determined that the plan
was not a good offered by a "place of public accommodation" because
the court defined "public accommodation" as a physical place.'
30
Denial of access to public accommodations does not apply to the way
the goods or services offered are arranged or set forth; rather, it refers
only to access to the physical place. 131 The court held that the insurer's
denial of coverage for heart transplants, while covering other organ
transplants did not discriminate in the provision of "good or service"
under Title III, and that the ADA does not prohibit insurance providers
from distinguishing among persons with different disabilities. .2
122See id.
t23See id.
124See id.
'
25See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010.
1261d. at 1011.
127179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
'
28See Lenox v. Healthwise of Kentucky, 149 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1998),
'
29See id. at 454.
3Old. at 456.
131See id.132See id. at 457-58.
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Similarly, the Third Circuit employed a narrow reading of the
ADA in Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp. 3 In Ford, the court held that
disparity in coverage for mental and physical impairments in a benefit
plan did not state a claim under Title III because there was no "nexus"
to a physical place. 134 The court further stated that there existed no
discrimination due to the fact that the "same" plan was provided to all
employees. 1
35
The third line of reasoning applied by courts is that application of
the ADA to the terms and conditions, or content, of insurance would
infringe on state regulation as was promulgated by the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.136 A more in depth analysis of this line of reasoning will
be addressed later in this article.
Jurisdictions Holding the ADA Applicable
to Discrimination in Insurance
Courts ruling that the ADA prohibits discrimination in insurance
policies have considered legislative history and agency guidance.
137
These courts have held that Title III guarantees more than mere
physical access to a "place.
' ' 3S
In Carparts Distribution Center, Inc., v. Automotive Wfholcsaler '
Association of New England, the First Circuit reversed a lower court
holding that Title III did not apply the content of insurance policies. 1
39
The court pointed to the fact that the statute listed "travel service"
within the list of public accommodations. 140 The court found that this
indicated Congress' intention for the statute to cover more than mere
physical access, since many travel agents conduct business over the
telephone. 14  The court pointed out: "[I]t would be irrational to
conclude that persons who enter an office to purchase services are
protected by the ADA, but persons who purchase the same services
'33145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1993).
134See id at 612-13.
135See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 603 (3d Cir. 1993)
136See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d 557,562 (7th Cir. 1999)
137See Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholezeler's A55"n of Net
England, 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding "public accommodation" vitlhin meaning of Title
III of ADA is not limited to actual physical structures).
'See id
'9See id at 19.
'14 See id
141See id.
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over the telephone or mail are not. Congress could not have intended
such an absurd result."'
142
The court in Carparts went on to discuss the consistency of
holding Title III to apPly to the content of insurance with legislative
history of the ADA. 1 3 The court stressed that the purpose of Title III
of the ADA was "to bring individuals with disabilities into the
economic and social mainstream of American life. . .in a clear,
balanced, and reasonable manner."'144 This purpose, together with the
fact that "there is nothing in that history that explicitly precludes an
extension of the statute to the substance of what is being offered,' 45
led the court to conclude that it could not have been Congress' intent
for Title III to be read so narrowly that people with disabilities could
not "fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges and advantages,
available indiscriminately to other members of the general public."146
Various other courts have followed the lead of the First Circuit.
Texas has recently allowed a Title III challenge to disparity between
benefits for mental and physical impairments in a long-term disability
plan provided by an employer. 147  Likewise, a California court has
recently upheld a Title III challenge to an insurer's provision of
insurance at increased premium to an applicant with muscular
dystrophy. The court decided that Title III means more than just
physical access to a building.14 8 Similarly, another California court has
rejected a defendant's argument that Title III prohibits only denials of
access to physical places and found Title III to reach denials of
insurance based on disability as well. 1
49
142Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19.
'
43See id. at 20.
1441d., quoting H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2. at 99 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 382).
14 'See id.
'
46See id.
147See Attar v. Unum, No. CA3-96-CV-367, R, 1998 WL 574885. at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug,
31, 1998).
148See Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1185, 1190 (N.D. Cal.
1998).
149See Kotev, 927 F. Supp. at 1320.
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DOE v. OMAHA INSURANCE COMPANY MUTU4L
On June 2, 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit decided that insurance caps on AIDS and AIDS-related
conditions, which were not justified by a cost analysis involving any
actuarial data, were not prohibited under the ADA. 150 The case was an
appeal from a decision of the District Court in the Northern District of
Illinois.' 5 '
District Court Decision
The facts that prompted this action began when plaintiffs John Doe and
Richard Smith purchased health insurance policies from Mutual of
Omaha. 152 Both plaintiffs were diagnosed with HIV.15 3 Both policies
covered general medical expenses for up to $1,000,000.154 However,
the two policies differed, in relevant part, with respect to the coverage
caps for AIDS-related conditions and AIDS treatment. 55 Doe's policy
placed a limit of $100,000 on the amount it would pay for HIV-related
care.156 Similarly, the policy assigned to Smith placed a ceiling on the
amount of coverage for AIDS treatment at $25,000.1' The plaintiffs
argue that these caps placed on their benefits have serious negative
effects on their ability to obtain and maintain the medical care needed
to fight the disease.158 The limits are particularly devastating because
the most effective strategy for fighting the virus involves earl)
intervention and requires a significant outlay of money at its onset.15)
Therefore, as plaintiffs argue, the ceiling placed on their coverage puts
them at risk of serious adverse health effects by "forcing an untimely
interruption in medical treatment."'160 Defendant Mutual of Omaha
conceded the fact these caps were not consistent with sound actuarial
principles, actual or reasonably anticipated experience, or bona fide risk
'15 See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559-60 (7th Cir. 1999).
1
-SSee Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 999 F. Supp. 1133, 1190 (N.D. Il1. 19923,
'
52See id
'See id. at 1190.
"'See idt
'See idt
'
56See Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1190.
"
7See idt
'"See id
'"See id
I 601d at 1191.
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classification.' 61 The district court held that the AIDS caps violated
Title III of the ADA.
162
The main issue examined in the district court's opinion revolved
around how to interpret Title III of the ADA with respect to insurance
policies. 163  The court specifically analyzed "whether Title III's
prohibition against unlawful discrimination extends to the content of
insurance policies offered directly through an insurer."'164 The specific
language upon which the court focused was the provision stating: "No
individual shall be discriminated against based on the basis of disability
in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accommodation."'165 The defendants argued
that the language of the ADA's Title III only applies to access to goods
and services exclusive of the goods and services themselves. 66 Mutual
reasoned that plaintiffs enjoyed the same policies as everyone else; thus
their claim of discrimination should not hold. 167  Alternatively,
plaintiffs argued that the defendant's reading was not logical because it
did not properly take into account the specific requirement that people
with disabilities be provided "full and equal enjoyment" of such goods
and services. 168 Furthermore, plaintiffs pointed to another provision in
Title III which states that discrimination will be present when an
individual is denied "the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a
good service, facility, privilege or advantage, or accommodation that is
not equal to that afforded to other individuals."' 169 Plaintiffs reasoned
that this phrase indicates that the ADA is meant to encompass more
than just plain access. 170 The court concluded that the plaintiff's
161Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1191.
162See id at 1197. The court did not discuss the issue of whether the plaintiffs were
persons with disabilities as defined by the ADA due to the fact that Mutual of Omaha did not
oppose the disability status of the insured. However, Mutual of Omaha did note that the issue
was one which was not clearly decided among the circuits. Id at n. 2.
163See id.
'641d. at 1191.
'
6See id., quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994).
166See Doe, 999 F.Supp. at 1191.
'
67See id.
168See id.
169See id., quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1994).
170See id.
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argument was ultimately more persuasive. 171 This decision was based
on three main factors including the plain language of the ADA,
legislative history, and the Department of Justice's guidelines relevant
to disability discrimination.
72
The court emphasized that the ADA's plain language mandates
full and equal enjoyment of goods and services. 173 This language, in
conjunction with the fact that the plain language novwhere limits the
scope of Title III to access, led the court to conclude that the broader
reading posited by the plaintiffs was correct.174
In addition, the court looked to the legislative history of the
ADA's Title 111.175 The court noted that the legislative history of the
House and Senate notes suported the idea that the ADA should apply
to the content of policies. 7 The court particularly focused on text,
which stated that insurance companies could not charge a different rate
for the same coverage to persons with disabilities on the basis of a
physical or mental impairment. 177
The court then looked to the Department of Justice's guidance that
states that the ADA "reaches insurance practices by prohibiting
differential treatment of individuals with disabilities in insurance
offered by public accommodations unless the differences are
justified." 178 The court recognized that this guidance was not binding,
however; it also emphasized the congressional proscription that the
Department of Justice regulations should be given controlling
significance unless they are determined to be completely at odds with
the statute. 179
Appellate Court Decision
The Appellate Court reversed the holding of the District court.' The
court based it's reasoning on "common sense" and held that the
171Doe, 999 F. Supp at 1191.
172id
'7See id
'
74See i
17SSee ide
176Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1193.
'
77See iae at 1193, quoting H.R.Rep. No. 101-435. pt 2, at 136-37 (1990). reprintd in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 419-20.
17'See id at 1194.
179See id at n. 6.
.SDoe, 179 F.3d at 564-67.
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"common sense of the statute is that the content of the goods or
services offered by a place of public accommodation is not
regulated."'' The court drew an analogy to various hypothetical
scenarios including a shoe store refusing to sell just one shoe to a
person with only one foot, a bookstore refusing to stock books in
Braille for a person who is blind, and a furniture store refusing to stock
wheelchairs. 2 The court used these hypothetical situations to
illustrate the point that just as it would be unreasonable to interpret the
ADA to hold the storeowners liable for failure to accommodate in these
circumstances, it would be similarly unreasonable to hold the defendant
insurance company liable for discrimination. 183 The court stated that,
in the aforementioned hypothetical situations, the storeowners are
neither refusing to allow people with disabilities physical access to
their facilities, nor are they refusing them equal enjoyment of the goods
and services once therein. 184 Central to this analysis was the fact that
all of the customers are essentially receiving the same product.' 
5
Thus, there is no singling out of customers with disabilities. The court
drew a parallel from these hypothetical situations to the situation under
dispute.' 8 6 The court stated that the insurance company is like the shoe
store, furniture store, and bookstore because it is not refusing to allow
plaintiffs access to the insurance policy. 187 The court further reasoned
that a policy without AIDS caps would be the equivalent of the
hypothetical one shoe, Braille book, and wheel chair. 188 Since, as seen
in the hypothetical situations, it would be unreasonable to force all
merchants to stock goods that were specially customized to fit each and
every person with a disability in various ways, it would be similarly
unreasonable to force plaintiffs responsible for tailoring their insurance
policies for the benefit of the single class comprised of persons with
AIDS. 189 "This is not a case of refusing, for example, to provide the
same coverage for a broken leg, or other afflictions not peculiar to
"'Id at 560.
'
32 See id.
183See id.
'
84See id.
ISSee Doe, 179 F.3d at 560.
'S6See id.
'.See id.
'See id.
'
89See id.
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people with AIDS, to such people, which would be a good example of
discrimination by reason of disability."'
190
The court then examined section 501(c)(1) of the ADA.' 9' Section
501(c)(1) of the ADA provides that both Titles I and III "shall not be
construed to prohibit or restrict an insurer... from underwriting risks,
classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not
inconsistent with State law,"' 92 "unless the prohibition or restriction is
a 'subterfuge to evade the purposes' of either title."' 9 3 The plaintiffs in
this case argued that since §501(c) protects insurers who manage their
risks based on sound actuarial data it follows that the section also
stands for the notion that insurers who do not classify risks are in
violation of the Act. 94 In support of this argument, the plaintiffs look
to legislative history which indicates that insurance companies may
limit coverage based on disability status if the limitation is based either
on "claims experience or on sound actuarial methods for classifying
risks."'195 The court discounts this provision as indicative of a violation
on the part of Mutual of Omaha, by virtue of its expressed absence of
sound actuarial data to back up the AIDS caps.""' In doing so the court
relies on the notion that the provision was essentially drafted for the
protection of insurance companies and that it would be "odd" for it to
be interpreted in such a way as is injurious to them. 197
Finally, the court finds that regardless of whether or not the safe
harbor provision and legislative history militates against the insurance
caps, the plaintiffs claim should fail on the basis of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.19s This act forbids a reading of a federal statute, which
serves to "impair any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance."'19) The court reasoned that to
dictate whether or not Mutual of Omaha's actions were w ithin their
"gDoe, 179 F.3d at 561.
'
91See id at 561-62.
19242 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(1) (1994).
193Id
"94Doe, 179 F.3d at 562.
'9kli at 562, quoting H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong.. 2d Sess. 136-37 (1990): S, Rep.
No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 84-S6 (1989).
'96See id.
'
9 7See id at 562.
1 3See id at 563, quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1994).
'Doe, 179 F.3d at 563, quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1212(b) (1994)
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legal bounds by virtue of a reading of the ADA, a federal statute, would
be to "step on the toes" of the state since it is essentially a state function
to regulate insurance. 20 0 Thus, the court reasoned, the ADA is, in a
sense, preempted by the state's own regulatory regime.20' Therefore,
the court held that the decision should be reversed.2U2 The court further
stated that the only appropriate body, which could offer relief in this
case, would be the state commissioners.
20 3
IMPACT AND ANALYSIS
In Doe & Smith v. Mutual of Omaha, the Illinois Appellate Court has
added another interpretation of whether Title III applies to the content
of insurance policies into the mix of contradictory decisions on this
issue. It seems that this decision, as well as others, which hold that the
ADA is not applicable to the content of insurance policies, will prove to
do a great disservice to the intent and meaning behind the ADA. This
is true for two reasons. First, the decision's reasoning seems to be
more of a stretch of logic than adherance to the ADA's basic
constructs. Second, the opinion does not promote a valuable public
policy theory.
Misplaced Reliance on the McCarran Ferguson Act
The Appellate court held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act2 04 precluded
the ADA from applying to the Mutual of Omaha AIDS and AIDS-
related Conditions caps.20 5  However, the court's reading of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act was too narrow in light of the Supreme Court
ruling in Humana Inc. v. Mary Forsythe et aL20 6 In Forsythe, the Court
held that the Act did not bar the application of RICO to fraudulent
insurance practices.20 7 The Court held that while federal statutes, under
the McCarran Ferguson Act, do not operate to automatically override
state insurance regulation, federal laws that specifically relate to
2
°
0 See id.
201See id. at 563.202See id.203See id. at 563-64.
20415 U.S.C. § 1012 (1994), cited in Doe, 179 F.3d at 562.
20 See Doe, 179 F.3d at 563.20 6Humana Inc. v. Mary Forsyth et al., 525 U.S. 299 (1999).
207See id.
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insurance do operate as preemptive of state law.203 The Court went
further to state that federal laws which do not specifically relate to the
business of insurance may still be enforceable to the extent that they do
not "invalidate, impair, or supercede" state law. 269 Therefore, the
assertion offered by the Appellate Court that the ADA is superceded by
the McCarran-Ferguson Act seems to be a stretch at best.
Taking this particular reasoning of the Appellate Court in
conjunction with the rest of the opinion, it becomes even more apparent
that it is a stretch. The Appellate Court goes to great lengths to explain
how the ADA would apply to insurance companies if, for example. the
insurance company were somehow attempting to preclude persons
infected with HIV.211 The Court stated:
There is ... a difference between refusing to sell a health-
insurance policy at all to a person with AIDS, or charging
him a higher price for such a policy, or attaching a condition
obviously designed to deter people with AIDS from buying
the policy.. ., on the one hand, and, on the other, offering
insurance policies that contain caps for various diseases some
of which may also be disabilities within the meaning of the
Americans with Disabilities Act."
21'
Looking at this in light of the brief discussion of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, with which the Court deals at the end of the opinion,
exposes an inconsistency. It seems that if this is truly a viable
argument, there would be no need at all to go into a discussion of
whether the ADA would cover the practice of Mutual of Omaha in
some hypothetical case. The Court seemed to contradict itself by
simultaneously advancing two inconsistent ideas. On the one hand the
Court held that the ADA would be applicable to an insurance provider
in the case where that provider is making it more difficult for people to
access insurance through cost. On the other hand, however, the Court
held that the ADA could not possibly apply to an insurer at all due to
the fact that the McCarran-Ferguson Act places all regulation of this
sort in the hands of the state commissioners. This inconsistency leads
2
°
3See id.
70'Id, at 304.
210See Doe, 179 F.3d at 563.21
'See id
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one to wonder which of these theories is viable and offers little in the
way of what future finders of fact can rely on for guidance.
One of the reasons the court decided that there was no
discrimination in this instance is that Mutual of Omaha offers the same
policy to all of its insured.212 Thus, as the reasoning goes, there is no
improper singling out,2 13 and no discrimination can possibly exist.
214
However, this oversimplified type of reasoning is of the same kind as
has been rejected in the similar context of sex discrimination. 215 In
relying on the argument that discrimination cannot possibly exist when
everyone is offered the same policy, the court circumvented previous
Supreme Court decisions.216 In Arizona Governing Comm. For Tax
Deferred Annuity and Deferred Comp. v. Norris, employees of the state
took issue with a pension plan that was offered to both men and women
equally. 217 The policy offered an annuity plan, however, which paid
out lower monthly benefits at retirement to women than to men.21 S The
Supreme Court rejected the argument that since the same plan was
offered to all policyholders there was no discrimination.2 19 The Court
held that this was blatant sex discrimination.220  It seems to follow,
therefore, that a policy based on disability status is similarly
discriminatory in nature. The same type of reasoning could easily
apply to a case involving disability discrimination. In Mutual of
Omaha, even though the plaintiffs are offered the same plan as all other
insured, they are specifically at a disadvantage due to the fact that the
policy excludes coverage for their particular disability just as the
women in Arizona Governing Comm. were specifically at a
disadvantage due to their particular gender. It is apparent by the
holding in that case that the Court will look at the overall effect and
2 12See id. at 562-63.213See id.214See id.2 15See Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Comp. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1080
(1983); Los Angeles Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707-08 (1978), The court in
Norris, concluded that "it is just as much discrimination 'because of ... sex' to pay a woman
lower benefits when she has made the same contributions as a man as it is to make her pay
larger contributions to obtain the same benefits." Norris, supra at 1086.216See id.217Norris, 463 U.S. at 1081.218See id.219See id.2
'
2 See id.
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impact of insurance plans to determine whether there truly exists
discrimination and will not merely accept a non-substantive semantic
argument on its face.
Public Policy
A second consideration, in the wake of this decision, is what effect it
will have on society in general, on persons infected with HIV, and on
the state. Mutual of Omaha renders the value of insurance policies for
people infected with HIV seriously diminished. In the wake of the
decision, people with HIV will have to be acutely aware that whatever
treatment they elect to undergo will toll their treatment funds. Thus
many people will likely elect not to take on treatments that are more
costly than others. It follows from this that they will become
increasingly ill at a faster pace. 221 This effect is in contradiction with
the intent of the ADA, which sets forth the hope that people with
disabilities become more productive members of society. 222
Unfortunately, most infected people will die sooner than necessary.
Research in this area is progressing at an exceeding rate. Thus many of
these people xvill not be able to take advantage of new treatments which
are becoming more effective, ill become non-productive members of
society due to illness or death, and all that they may have given through
this production wvill be lost.
On a financial level, the legitimization of insurance caps on AIDS
and AIDS-related conditions wvill place a greater burden on state
resources. Since there will be limited financial resources within the
insurance context for people infected with HIV to rely upon they will
have to default to their own funds. These funds will likely be
liquidated quickly due to the costs of treatment. Therefore, most
people with HINV ill eventually become dependant on state Medicaid
resources for what limited treatment it vll cover. This phenomenon
vill have a negative effect on the economy in general, since there will
be a drain on state resources where it would be more fiscally healthy
for the loss to be handled by insurance companies. The purpose is to
spread loss in light of sound risk management techniques.2 3  The
221See id
222Norris, 463 U.S. at 1081.
223Eric C. Sohigren, Note, Group Health Benefits DiscrImination Iamst iD" It twv
Falling through the Gaps of Federal Lau,-ERISA, the Rehabiltaton Act ani th? lri-r,, sm
2000)
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impact of this decision reverts from this purpose. It will place a great
percentage of the loss upon state resources and take all risk of loss out
of the hands of the insurance providers.
CONCLUSION
Reading the ADA to cover the terms of insurance policies would allow
the purpose and intent of the legislation to ring true. Advancing
medical research in the treatment of AIDS and AIDS-related conditions
allows people with the virus to be more effectively treated if they begin
treatment in the early stages of the disease. Placing caps on the
treatment of AIDS will stifle this effective treatment, lead to early
death, and prematurely rob society of all that these people offer. Caps
will also place a drain on the resources of the state. However, most
importantly, allowing insurance caps based solely on disability status,
without any sound actuarial data relating treatment to cost, will feed
and nourish the pernicious stigma attached to people with HIV and
AIDS. Passivity to such a stigma is something for which this country's
jurisprudence clearly does not stand.
with Disabilities Act, 24 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1247, 1300 (1991).
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